Embedded Files
Journal Articles
Nāgārjuna and the Structure of Reality. Forthcoming. Journal of Indian Philosophy.
Abstract: Nāgārjuna claims that the ultimate reality must be taught through reliance on customary ways of talking and thinking (vyavahāra) which do not express it. What property could some specific vyavahāra possess, if not truth, which would have it reliably teach people the ultimate reality? Nāgārjuna does not tell us, and a lack of a satisfactory answer may undermine the coherence of his thought. I attempt to resolve this issue by proposing a form of structural correspondence between language and reality which I think is consistent with Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. This relies on arguing that reports of experiences are truth-valued even if ontological claims never are, and that the truthmaker of experience reports is reality (tattva), not just hypostatization (prapañca).
Preprint link soon.
Poincaré’s Radical Ontology. 2023. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. Volume 13, number 1.
Abstract: I present an exegesis of Henri Poincaré’s metaphysical position in three key essays within his book, The Value of Science. In doing so, I argue for three theses: First, that Poincaré’s metaphysical position in these sources is incompatible with his metaphysical position in his earlier book, Science and Hypothesis. Second, that the phenomenological relationism defended by Poincaré in these sources is not a form of structural realism but a structuralist form of empiricism, and (by design) has no greater metaphysical commitments than constructive empiricism. Third, that Poincaré holds in these sources that the existence of the external world is merely a convention. These theses serve to correct misconceptions about the consistency of Poincaré’s philosophical corpus, about his position(s) on the realism/anti-realism landscape, and about the scope of his conventionalism.
Link : https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/724050
A Kantian reading of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: the philosophical basis and advantages. 2019. Philosophy East and West, Volume 69, number 4.
Abstract: This article defends an interpretation of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that takes it to be an attempt to undermine all existential judgments. It is then argued that introducing the Kantian idea of categories to the text's methodology provides it significant systemic support. Kant's metaphysical views are clearly distinguished from Nāgārjuna's.
Link: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745282
I upload my philosophy of science preprints to the PhilSci Archive.
Dissertation
Conventionalism and Structuralism in Madhyamaka and Science
My dissertation has two guiding principles. The first is that the unique metaphysical perspective of the 2nd century Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna is basically correct. The second is that any metaphysical perspective which is to be taken seriously should have an informed and sophisticated treatment of the nature and incredible successes of the natural sciences. The project accordingly has two major goals corresponding to these principles. The first is to introduce readers to my novel interpretation of the conclusion, methodology, and nature of Nāgārjuna’s philosophical project. The second is to explain the success of science in a way that is consistent with Nāgārjuna’s perspective, which is not obviously compatible with any existing position in the contemporary philosophy of science literature.
To these ends, I develop the notion of ontological conventionalism, which holds that sentences asserting the existence or non-existence of things in the world lack truth-values and should be adopted or rejected by free choice. And I introduce a novel way to make claims only about the structure of systems which underlie experience. This form of structural realism is uniquely able to answer radical scepticism.
Presentations
Nāgārjuna and the Structure of Reality. XIXth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Seoul, South Korea. 2022.
Poincare's Radical Ontology. Oxford Philosophy of Physics Seminar. 2023.
Google Sites
Report abuse